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PREFACE

SOME
idea that a Russian Invgsion of India,
'

I

on a scale adequate to success, was an
impossible thing, dawned upon me when,
serving on the army staff in the Afghan
War of 1878-79-80, I was brought face to
face with the difficulties attendant on moving and feeding a few thousand men in
the desert bf Beluchistan and the Afghan

I
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1
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1
1

mountains ; but *it was not till I began to
write a history of that war, that ' h e conficmatory testimony borne
to, the views
6
whioh I had begun to entertain, by the
wider information gained t o m the materials
placed a t my clisposal by the kindness of

('8

the Government of India, on the one hand,
+#
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PREFACE

and by that of private friencls, on the
other, gave to them first clearness and

,
I

precision, and then stlch strength and con!
I

,

viction that I felt compelled to lay aside,
for a time, the larger work in which, in due
course, they ~ o u l dhave appeared, in order
to combat, at once and directly, the error
which, so long as it keeps its hold on the
public mind, must prove a perennial source
of danger, trouble, and loss to Great

1

Britain's Indian Empire.
If I can succeed in convincing iny
countrymen that the fear of Russia, with
which they have been so 'carefully inocu-

I

I

lated, i8 groundless, the hands of the
British and Indian Governments will be
strengthened to resist the ignorant politicians and ambitious soldiers who are con-

-

1

I

I

stantly trying to drive them into wild
adventures, which will, as they well Itnow,
I

l;
'I,

I

swallow up the proceeds of every fresh tax
which they may lay upon an already over-"
burdened people, bgsides adding enormously
to India's indebtedness. I n Tract No. 2
I shall hope to sl~ow,in the same practical
and sober manner in which I have ape
proached the problem of a Russian invasion
of India, how weak and unstable is the
present frontier of that country, and how
much weaker and more unstable it has every
prospect of becoming, if the shaping of
her foreign policy is to be left in the hands
which are *guiding it to-day. But what
I have already *written ought, I think, to
open the eyes of all intelligent men to the
fact that every step that we take beyond
the limits imposed upon our Indian Empire
by Nature herself, tends to reverse the
order of things which I have been depicting : the difficulties and dangers which,
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in case of war between Russia and ourselves,

I

t!

would once ]lave been hers, falling to us;
and the advantages- which we must have

i

1I

enjoyed, being wilfully handed over to her.
T h e inevitable end of the policy which

n

i
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t
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plished, our troops ,will be in exactly the

i

same position as ,my hypothetical Russian
Army on reaching the Indus-with
their
communications lost, their stores exhausted,
with no local source of supply from which

j
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to replenish them, and with a warlike and

1
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I
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for the last nineteen years we have been
I
pursuing on India's north -western and
northern frontiers is an advance on the
Oxus ; and, when that has been accom-
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I

lzostile population in their rear.

.

.

I do not

0

deny that a small British force might penetrate to the left bank of the great Central
Asian stream, but I do dispute that it
could accomplish anything when it got

'I

I
I

iI

I

I

?
1
L

_?&&

.

I
I

8

i

I

PROFACE

I

I

there : indeed, there would be nothing for

,I *

it to accomplish-Russia being, so far as.
we are concerned, invulnerable in Asia,
just as we are invulnerable, so far as she

I

is concerned, in India,-and we should have
exchanged our old frontier, :overed by a
river, a desert, and a double range of

1

*

I

,
I

I
I

I

mountains, and close to our own rich and

1
1

populous provinces, for a new frontier, also,
indeed, covered by a river and a desert,
but with those same mountains behind
instead of in front of it, and with more
than 600 miles of the most difficult country
in the world between it and the State to
whose security it will be supposed 20 contribute,-and
all this merely to forestall
e
Russia in the possession of territory that
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is as useless to her as to us, and which,
apart from a desire to blihd and delucle
us, she can have no reason for menacing.

I

I

I believe the Russian Government to be

,!

fully aware of the hopelessness of any

I

r

scheme for invading- British India, and to
be free from all intention of making the
attempt ; but so long as it shares our
belief that its country and ours are natural
enemies, so long will it be its aim and
its interest to embarrass and weaken us in
Asia. And how can it do this more effectually than by giving us, from time to
time, just such sufficient cause for alarm as
shall induce us to scatter our troops more
and more widely, and t o squander more
and more of our moneyo on worse than
useless Enterprises-or rather India's money,
a different and far more serious thing, since
financial trouble, in the case of a country
administered by a foreign power, means
political discontent.
In playing this game, Russia runs no risk.

.

I
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What does it matter to her whether a few
thousand British troops are on her side of.
the Hindu *Kush or not? She lrnows that
they can never strike at any vital point of
her dominions, and so can afford to look
on and laugh in her sleeve whilst our
generals add

50,000

or 60,000 square miles

to the British Empire, and the Indian
Finance Minister raclcs his brain to discover
some new source of revenue from which
to pay the price of their militant patriotism.
As I have said, within their own natural
boundaries; both States are invulnerable ;
but Russia has- over us the immense adi,~

i

vantage that she knows her own Security,
whilst we distrust ours. Whether, however,
rn

her policy of tempting us on to our hurt
is really a wise one, is a very different
question, and one on which I shall have

r

something to say in Tract No. 3.

I

I

xiv
One word in conclusion.

Many of my

old brother officers share, I am fully con-

s

i

vinced, the views expressed ,in these pages,
though the trammels of oficial position, or
preoccupation with other matters, or unwillingness to rush into controversy, has
w

hitherto kept them silent.

T o one and all

of these I now appeal to come forward
and give me their support in this attempt
to dispel an error which is endangering the
prosperity, it may be even the existence,
of that great Indian Empire which every
Englishman desires to strengthen and uphold,-none more warmly -than those who
are notoafraid to resist the temptation to
extend it.
0

H. B. HANNA.

Marchz~.,1895,
JUNIOR ARMY AND NAVYCLUB,

ST. JAMES'S S T ~ E E TS.W.
,
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CAN RUSSIA INVADE I N D I A ?

CAN RUSSIA INVADE INDIA?
CHAPTER I
0

INTRODUCTORY REMARICS

THEbelief that an invasion of Great Britain's
Indian Empire by Russia, through Afghanistan, is, if not a probable, at least a possible
contingency, has more to do than even the
depreciated rupee with the financial difficulties of tl-iat great dependency, since it
is in consequence'of that belief that India's
frontiers are being steadily pushed Forward
into regions which can contribute nothing
to their own administratio% ; that fortifications, large and small, are being erected on
different points of those fronyiers ; that large
and ever larger numbers of men are being
concentrated in countries which cannot
A

,

b
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supply their wants, thus necessitating a
corresponding increase in military transport
of all kinds ; and that* railways are being
constructed at enormous cost, through practically uninhabited and uninhabitable wastes.
Yet that belief is, to this day, only an assumption, anfl owes its hold on the public ,
mind largely to the facts enumerated above.
That viceroys ancl commanders-in-chief in
India should extend her frontiers, multiply
her fortifications, isolate her troops in inaccessible mountain fastnesses, and sink her
money in unproductive railways, is sufficient
in itself to convince most men of the reality
and imminence of a danger against which
all the= disastrous precautions have to be
talten ; and there call be no doubt that they
exercise a similarFinfluence on the minds of
their own authors. But a belief, however
firmly held and*however strongly attested,
should not be accepted as true unless it
can be shown to rest upon proofs ; ancl this
C

I

i
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I

I

I
I
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1

1

belief, that India is open to attaclr on her
north - west frontier, has never yet been
proved, in the onjyewap which can give it
a claim to acceptance by reasonable minds,
viz. by showing how and at what cost she
can be successfully invaded.
'.
Two men of exceptional mil~tary]<nowleclge and ability, Sir Charles MacGregor
and Sir Edward Hamley, have, indeed,
addressed themselves to the task, and
both, though in very different degrees,
ended their investigations by giving their
assent to the popular creed; but the one
confined his ittention to a consideration of
Russia's military resources and to the mapping out of her onward movements, *stage
by stage, without any attempt to show
#
under what conditions those movements
would have to be made ; and the other
wasted his admirable reaso:ing
on erroneous data.
Now, Russia's capacity to put into the field

1
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a force sufficiently large and well-equipped
to deserve to be pronounced adequate to
so great an undertaking as the invasion of
India, is only one of the points which must
be taken into account before we can venture
to affirm that she will, or may, at some
future time,* actually enter upon it; and
conclusions which rest upon entirely mistaken impressions as to the nature of the
country which Russian forces, marching by
way of the Bolan (and Sir E. Hamley
denies that they are likely to come by any
other), would have to traverse, after issuing
from the mountains, before they could reach
the Indus, carry with theh.1, with respect be
it spo&enJno weight at all.
Experience, however, I shall be told, is
the best of allmproofs,and that India has
been invaded not once, but many times, is
an historical fict which it would be absurd
to question.
No man has more respect for the teachings

.

I
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of experience than I, but if there is one thing
more than another that I have learnt from ,
it, it is that we are never safe in collnectillg
conclusions drawn from one set of circumstances with a second set differing from
the first in any essential particular; and
surely the difference is enorGous between
the India of the days of Alexandkr the
Great, or of Timor the Tartar, or of Baber,
or of Nadir Shah, divided, generally in name,
and always in fact, into many states, each
actively or passively hostil'e to all the rest,
and Great Britain's Indian Empire, no
longer weak by internal divisions, but strong
in the unity of it$ government, and one for
all purposes of national defence; *nor is
there much likeness between the lightly
equipped, swift-moving bolts ' of Greek, or
1 In much more recent days, the old style of warfare has
been witnessed. Captain John W o o 4 of the Indian Navy,
writing in 1838, tells us, that the forces of Morad Bey,
the Chief of Icunduz, 15,000 strong, con~posedentirely of
cavalry, were well adapted to predatory warfare, for which

d

r

Moghul, or Persian, which successfully
penetrated beyond the Indus, and the
highly organised, .sloyv ;movbg Russian
army which we are asked to believe may,
some day, do the same.'
I t sounds a paradox to say that the vast
improvement that has taken place in the
implements and appliances of war since the
latest of the successful invasions of India,
has diminished, to an extent which it is
difficult to estimate, the probability of her
ever being invaded again ; yet the seeming
paradox is a simple truth, which, in the
course of these pages, I trust I shall be
neither infantry nor guns were esse'ntial, the horses, though
small, k v i n g great power, being able to endure much
fatigue for ten successive days, carrying grain for themselves and riders. But a Russian army could not advance
upon India after this Ashion.-1-1. B. H.
' An ancient army had its impedimenta, but these were
playthings in comparison with the ordnance train of a
modern army ; the tfil which it inflicts whenever difficulties
are to be overcome, on the not degenerate soldier of the
nineteenth century, must be witnessed to be coinprehended!-Sir
H. Durand.

.

able to bring home to the minds of my
readers.
T h e belief in
vqlnerability of India's
north west frontier rests, I repeat, upon
assumptions, and before it can b e pronounced safe to hold or preach it, a minute
and, careful study must be made of all the
conditions under which a n invasion of that
country would have to be carried out. Few
persons have the time to do this for themselves; I venture, therefore, t o submit to
all who are interested in the subject the
results of such a study, uildertalre~lby one
who, a t least, possesses this qualification
personal acquaintance with
for the task-a
the countries he will have t o describe
and t h e difficulties he must weigh and
e
estimate.'

-

On the army staff, I marched with General BiddulpliJs
force by the Bolan to Kandahar, a d thence to the Helmand, returning to India by'the Thal Chotiali route ; and
in the second phase of the war, I was at Kabal, going and
returning by the Khyber.-H. B. H.

8
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To make my argument siml>ler, c l e a r e r ,
and, in the end, I hope, I n o r e convilzcing,
' I will assume that ye arme standing w h e r e
we stood in 1876, when Q u e t t a was only a
little Belucl~itown, and when, except 0 1 1
the Peshawar side, o u r north-west frontier,
for defensiverpurposes, was practically the
,e
Indus, borrowing only f r o m the s i t u a t i o n ,
connectio~l
as it is to-day, t w o features-the
of Peshawar with K a r a c h i b y railway,' and
the protected bridges at A t t a c k and S u k k u r ,
which secure to Our armies t h e c o m m a l l d of
both sides of the great r i v e r o v e r wllicll
they have been thrown.
The connection between P e s h a w a r and Multan is a
doubIe one since the construction of the Sind-Sagar railway,
on the leff bank of the 1ndus.-H. B. H.
1
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INDIA'S NATURAL DEFENCES, AND TI-IE
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AFGI-IAN PASSES

1

MILITARYwriters recognise three great
natural lines of defence : a desert, a mountain range, and a river, the relative value
of which accords with theaorder in which
I have placed them, and their absolute
value, on the extent of the first and the
number and capacity of its springs ; on the
height, depth, and ruggedness of the second ;
and on the width and rapidity of the third.
Mountains and a river guard the whole
length of India's north-west frontier, and
to these for more than threc-fourths of the
distance is added the desert; whilst each
of these natural defences is of extraordinary
0

strength-the mountains lofty, rugged, and
barren, their defiles narrow and of great
length ; the river .wide. and rapid at all
times, and in the rains, or during the melting
of the snows, dangerous for boats and impossible to bridge ; whilst the desert varies
in width fmm 50 miles to 160, and is /
traversable only on the two or three lines
along which wells are to be met with.
From Peshawar on the north-east to
Dadar on the south-west, the great mountain ranges whieh form India's first line of
defence against invasion, are about 650 miles
in length, and are pierced only by five passes,
through which any large body of men could
possibly move. Other so-called roads there
are, used no doubt by the inhabitants, but
these are the "merest tracks, from which
trade shrinks back affrighted, and by which
no invader ever has attempted, or ever will .
attempt, to march.
T o these five routes-the Bolan, the Tllal

i

Chotiali, the Gomul, the Kuram, and the
IChyber -we may therefore confine our
attention, for-if it tag be.showa that through
none of these is an invasion of the India
of to-day possible, the most timid Russophobist will harclly make himself unhappy
\ about any other; but before sketching the
distinctive features of each, I must point
out that the Khyber, the Kuram, and the
Gomul present quite a different aspect,
according as tve consider them from the
point of view of an Anglo-Indian army
advancing from India to assist or subdue
Afghanistan; but with no ulterior object,
or of a Russian army moving down upon
India. T o us, their length is represented
by the actual number of miles from Peshawar to Kabul, or from Ratval Pindi to
Kabul, or from Multan vi2 Dera Isfimael
K l ~ a nand Ghazni to Kabul ; to them, Ghazni
or Kabul are but stages in a journey,
which begins either at Ka~tdaharor on the

I
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Oxus ; and this difference carries with it yet
another in the case of the Khyber, namely,
that to us that route is .open. all the year
round, whilst to the Russiatls it can be but
a summer road, since the Ghazili Highlands,
no less than the Hindu I<ush, are blocked
A'by snow from October to April.
The reason for the distinction which I
have just drawn, the true significance of
which will be apprehended by my readers
later on, is clear : roe possess in Peshawar,
or Rawal Pindi,' or Multan, a true base o i
military operations, and in Kabul or Ghazni
the Rzssians will possess ndthing of the
kind.
Ho% woulcl it be possible, for instance,
to concentrate ~oo,oooor 150,000 troops
at Kabul when !hat city suffers itself every
winter from scarcity, and a t all tirnes llas
to draw part ofTts food-supply from Ghazni ?
It could not support the garrison which its
conquerors must keep within its walls, and

1

- -- .
a

I

$

I
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I

there would not be a bushel of flour or a
pound of meat to spare for the neecls of a
huge field force ; peithqr could the whole
lringdom of Kabul do more than furnish
an insignificant fraction of the transport that
would be required to enable it to move.
Nor can Ghazni be acceptred as such
an army's starting-point. It, too, must be
garrisonecl, and that garrison must absorb,
a t ICabul's cost, all its surplus provisions,
leaving nothing over for troops passing
through on their way to *the Khyber, or
concentrating there before beginning their.
march by the Gomul.
Of course neither at Kandahar nor on
the Oxus would Russia possess a t r w base,
but as that disadvantage is common to all
the routes by which her gdvance on India
must be made, ancl as I have no intention,
and certainly no need, to mrry my inquiry
into the difficulties in the way of such an
advance, beyond the limits of Afghanistan,

'1

1
1
I

I

1

I
II
I

i
II

I

I
I

1

b

I4

CAN RUSSIA 1,NVADE INDIA

?

I shall not try to determine the exact spot
where her great military adventure may be
held to begin.' Fqr my,purppse it will be
sufficient if I can convince my readers
that Afghanistan can hardly feed her own
people, and has nothing to spare to outsiders, whether they call themselves conquerors or friends. A few facts will,
I thinlr, place my contention beyond
dispute.
When the leading column of Sir John
Keane's army of 9.500 men entered Kandahar
in I 839, having exhausted its supplies by the
way, grain rose to thirteen-pence the pound,
and the inhabitants of the city were reduced
t o starvation, without relieving the British
It was not the capture of Sebastopol, nor even the
immense losses of the Russian armies in the Crimea, which
compelled the Emperor Nicholas to sue for peace in 1855,
but the drain on his resources consequent on the having to
carry on sp vast a Jtruggle in a remote corner of his
empire; and what is the distance betwecn Moscow or
St. Petersburg and Sebastopol compared to that which
separates European Russia from British India?-H. B. H.

.
L
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commander o f the painful necessity of keeping his troops on half rations.'
When Sir I?. Roberts gccupied Kabul in
September I 8;79, he had with him but 6000
men, yet he had t o send out troops far and
wide to gather in supplies for man and
.beast; and in the process h% drove the
inhabitants to such fierce despair-for to surFamines a r e of frequent occurrence in Afghanistan.
Dr. Bellew, in his JollrnaZ of n Political Mission to Afgnnistalz, tells us of o n e which he witnessed in ICandahar in the
year 1857. 'Whilst traversing the filthy lanes of the city
. we had full a n d painful proof of tFe sufferings of the
people from the combined effects of scarcity and pestilence.
. This terrible pestilence and famine continued with
unabated severity f ~ fully
r six weelrs after our arrival, and
the daily scenes of hideous suffering we encountered on our
way to the open country proved a most painful ordeaL
.
'The sufferings and privations of the Kandaharisduring
this famine were really terrible.
During this trying
period we had considerable difficulty in feeding our horses
and baggage animals, and for several'days could get no
grain whatever, and but srdall supplies of fodder. The
price of barley was four seers the rupee,
wheat-Aour
sold at two s e e r s the rupee. . At suck prices, the poor
could get no flour at all, and for several months subsisted
on clover and lucern, wild herbs and mulberry leaves,
which they as often ate uncooked as coolred.'

. .
..

..

. ..

..

...

render to us, no matter a t what price, their
little stores of grain and bhoosa (chopped
straw) was to leave the@ families, their live
stoclr, and themselves, to die of hunger
during the ensuing winter-that the whole
country rose in arms against our exactions,
and, driving before them the detachments.
scattered through the hills, shut us up in the
Sherpur cantonments, whence we were on1y
released by Sir Charles Gough's bold yet
well-considered advance from Jugdalali to
our assistance.'.
I could multiply instances to prove the
poverty of Afghanistan, but one general
statement covers all-with the exception of
n few hzanrtred seers of ake, a good dead
It is true that the attack on Sherpur was delivered and
repulsed before ~ o ? ~could
h reach the scene of action, but
it was the lrnowledge that he was close at hand, and the
exaggerated rumours as to the strength of his force, born of
the very audacitymof his advance, which determined the
moment of that attack, and was the cause of the complete
disbandment of the tribesmen that followed its failure.H. B. R.

of f r ~ i t ahd a little honey, that country

exforts no food-stufs of any L i d . This
fact once grxped, .it becomes self-evidenl:
that wherever the base of a Russian army
advancing upon India by the Khyber or
the Icuram may be, it is not at Kabul,
and that I am justified in tr2ating their
march as beginning at Kandahar, since I
am not prepared to complicate the calculations which I shall shortly lay before my
readers, by tracing it backwards to I-Ierat,
and from Herat to the Caspiin Sea.

Route I
From Icandahar to Multan by the Bolan Pass &d the
Desert of Beluchistan. Distance vid Jacol~abadand
Suklrur 678 miles, vid Jacobabad, Rajunpoor, and
Mithankot 606 miles, vid Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi
Khan 605 miles.

Since the appearance of Srr H. awli inson's famous Memorandum up to the present
day, when the writings of various aclventur13

ous travellers have brought the roads by the
Baroghil and Dura Passes into public favour,
the attention of the politician of-the 'scientific
frontier ' school has been chiefly absorbed
by the Bolan route, on the defence of which,
at their instigation, a large proportion of
the vast s m s of money which have been
sunk in fortifications and in strategical roads
and railways has been lavished.
After emerging from the smiling Kandahar Valley, this route runs for 70 miles
over a stony *aste, intersected by weirdlookillg hills, yet sufficiently open for several
columns to move over it simultaneously;
and crosses the Khwaja Amran Range-the
ascent most precipitous, the descent, except
near the summit, fairly easy-into the Pishin
Valley, a tableGnd 5000 feet above sea-level
' which can scarcely feed a single cavalry
regiment," arrd in which, for three or four
marches, the water is brackish.
Captain C. Hoskyns, R.E.

There are three roads over the Khwaja
Amran Range, of varying length and difficulty, all of .which we. will suppose the
Russians to use, but after passing Quetta,
their advance must be made in one long line.
T h e Bolan, the pass from which this route
takes its name, is 59 miles in length, offers
few camping-grounds, and is in parts excessively steep and narrow ; in rugged savageness, and utter barrenness, it may, perhaps,
be rivalled by othe'r Afghan defiles-to excel
it is impossible. In the hot weather the
heat in it is excessive, in the rains it is
swept by fierce and sudden floods ; the road
is shingle and grit, strewn with stones and
small boulders, most trying to the h o r s a and
transport animals, wearing the feet of the
bullocks to the quick ; and Jgain and again
the road crosses the river, through which the
men must wade up to their wafsts in water.l
And yet the worst dificulties of this route
1

In one march alone, fourteen times.-IS.

B. H.
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do not begin till the invading army enters on
its march across the plain, 160 miles broad,
which still separates it &om the Indus, the
plain over which Sir E. Ilamley, misled by
information obtained ,from ' the best au thority '-how
one would like to know that
authority's name !-actually believed troops
could marc11 'on a wide formation, closely
accompanied by all their trains and baggage."
That plain for I 15 miles is either arid desert
or low jungle, and for the remaining 45 miles,
pestilential marsh. Wells there are, but a t
long distances apart, necessitating several
marches of 16 and one of 2 6 g miles, and so
soon exhausted or so difficult to draw from, o n
accofi~tof their great depth, that the Bengal
column of the army of the Indus, already
mentioned, which n~archedfrom Shikarpur to
the Bolan in 1839, had t o be brolte~l u p
into eight detachments, the cavalry into half
Lecture on the Strategical Conditions of our Indian
North-West Frontier.
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regiments ; and to crown all, the water ifi
several instances is so brackish that the
parched horses rduse .to drink it. Near
some of these wells there are villages, each
wit11 its tiny plot of cultivated ground, but
these can afford no supplies. T o wander
from the traclr which leads frbm one well
to another is to lose oneself in an utterly
waterless wilderness, and to die either of
thirst or by the sword of the Beluchi
robber.'*
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I-Iow, then, can an advance on a wide
formation be a possible thing ? T h e actual
advance will' be in small bodiesj2 which,
struggling painfully forward, must fall a n
easy prey to an Anglo- Indian army, w^nethcr

' If the traveller wanders from the right direction, h e
may lose his way and die in the waterless tract. Guides
must always accompany every detachment.'-Major
Hough.
2 ' There is no insunnountable obstaae to the march of a
large army' (measured, surely, by Anglo-Indian ideas of
large) ' Jy .rttlaU detac7znren.t~nt a tiwc in the cool nzontAs.'
-Sir H. Haveloclt's Wnv i7z Afi7znnisl~m.
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its commander elect to meet them at Jacobabad or a t Sulrltur.
Supposing, however, that* the Indian
military authorities should have cletermined
to offer no opposition at either of these
two points, but to defer their attack until
the enemy %ere still further wealtened in
strength and red.uced in numbers, our
invaders, after concentrating at Jacobabad,
could adopt one of three courses : they
could cross the Indus at Sukltur and
march on the left banlc of that river, b y
district roads and the railway line, t o
Multan, a distance of 328 niiles; or they
might turn to the north-east and follow
the fr'ontier road, which runs between the
desert and the Indus marshes, to the
Mithanlrot ferry, and thence advance
3 r 6 miles ; o r
upon Multan-distance,
lastly, they niight continue on the right
bank of the river, as far as Dera Ghazi

>

1
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Khan, effect ' its passage there, and, so,
reach Multan, a distance of 255 miles.
T h e latter rpute is the shorter, otherwise
none has any advantage over the others.
All are alike, unhealthy and destitute of
supplies, and by each, in addition to the
Indus, a second great riven has to be
.passed-the Sutlej by the first and second ;
the Chenab by the third-besides a large
number of nullahs, most of which must be
bridged, or ramped, to enable the artillery
t o cross them.
There is a shorter road to Rajanpoor direct from Dadar, at the eastern
mouth of the Bolan; but this was provecl
by the experience of the British troops,
who had the misfortune to be sent by
it in 1878, to be so unfit'for the passage
of even a very small force, that we need
not lake it into account when considering the possible movements of a large

I
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army.l Whether the Russians will venture
to make use of any of those, which I have
thought it worth yhile ,to en,umerate, is a
question on which I shall throw more light
later on,

'

Route I .

From ICandahar to Multan, by the Rhojalc Pass, the Pishin
Valley, the Icakar Ilills, and Dera Ghazi Khan;
commonly known as the Thal Chotiali Routedistance, 459 miles.

As far as I<illa Abdullah, in the Pishin
I n 1878 it had been originally intended that both
divisions of Lhc Icandahar force should m p c h froin Mithanlcot to Dadar, but General Biddulph, commanding the
troops that actually toolc this road, sent back so unfavourable a rgport, that it was hastily decided to divert the main
body, under General Donald Stewart, to Sukkur, and to
make the passage of tho desert from that point. Any one
desiring to obtain a cfear insight into t h e conclitions under
which troops are moved in Beluchistan, will do well to read
Biddulph's lecture, entitled ' March from the Indus to the
Helmand and Baclq' which h e will find in vol. xxiv. No.
107, of the Journal ofthe Royal United Service I?rslilutio?z.
To the accuracy and moderation of this narrative, I can
myself bear testimony.--H. 13. I-I.

Valley, this route is identical with that
which has just been described ; but at that
point it diveiges from .it and runs nearly
due east, first crossing range after range
of rugged hills, one of which attains a
height of 8457 feet, and then traversing a
district, which Sir C. MacGregor has describecl ' as consisting chiefly of a hot,
arid wilclerness, stretching as far as the
eye can reach, unrelieved by water, trees,
or even villages.'
There are low-lying, fairly open valleys
between the ridges, where the traders, who
once used this road, may have founcl
sufficient forage for their camels ; but the
British field force, which returned to
India this way in 1879, had to carry not
only all ordinary suppIies,' but also grain
for the trailsport animals, and, so long
ago as 1505, the Emperor Baber complained of his cavalry having been starved
in marching by the Thal Chotiali.

1

T h e Indus once crossed a t Dera Ghazi
Khan, only 43 miles will separate the invaders from Multan; .but in these few
marches there are two branch channels of
the Indus t o cross, the Chenab, and fortyfive nullahs. T h e amount of poiltoons and
tressels which a Russian army advancing
into India by any of the five routes, but more
especially b y the Gomul, the Thal Chotiali,
and the Bolan, would have t o carry with
it must add enormously to its transport
difficulties, whilst the endless bridging
operations would greatly delay its moveinents.
Of ;he Thal Chotiali route, one cannot
say positively that it is impracticable in
winter, for in mild seasons it occasionally
remains open. yet the uncertainty that
must exist on this point will always deter
a would-be conqueror of India from relying
upon it as a line of communication with,

1

and retreat upon, Russia, and without
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communications, and at least a chance of
salvation in case of defeat, it would be
criminal madness to expose ail army, great
or small, to the chances of war. That
this would be its position in summer,
supposing it to enter India in the spring,
or t o be able to maintain *itself there
throughout the cold weather, is certain,
since no European troops could cross the
desert, narrow as it is, by this route between
May and October.

Rode 111
From Ghazni to Multan, by the Ghwalari Pass, the Gomul
River, ancl Dera Ishmacl Kban-distance, 666 miles.'

This little-known road to India is closed
at one end by heat in sununer, and at the
other end by cold in winter. A small
body of men, if prepared to lose its communications, even before reaching India,
The authority for this route is Broadfoot, the only
European, I believe, who has ever traversed it.-13. I3. I-I.

and to be l~elplesswhen it got there, might
slip through the Gomul after the rains ; but
a large army must e i t h e ~expose its leading
columns to the pestilential heat of the desert
in September, or risk being cut in two by
the snow which begins to fall in the Ghazni
Highlands in October. I n the matter of
length, and of the physical difficulties to be
overcome, it may be classed with the Bolan ;
and though Broadfoot, who travelled through
it more than fifty years ago, speaks of ample
forage for camels, he had in his mind the
roo0 camels of the trade Kafila to which he
had attached himself, or, at the most, the
transport animals of a British regiment, not
the l~andredsof thousands of beasts of all
descriptions, without which, as I have
already said, no' Russian army, numerically
strong enough to venture into British India,
could possibly move. T h e Gomul has, too,
like both the preceding routes, the disadvantage of debouching into an arid desert,

I

intersected by ravines, ramifying into nuinerous fan-like branches, which would oblige
the invaders l o advance in long unwieldy
columns, with a coiltracted front, exposed to
the attacks of the British troops, who would
be lying perdz~ in the one beautiful oasis
which. breaks tlie monotony of this desolate
and deadly plain. Ancl supposing these to
be driven back and Dera Ishmael Khan
occupied, they would still be confronted,
like their friends at Dera Ghazi IChan, by
the Indus, which they would have to bridge
in the face of an enemy superior in every
respect to themselves, with no better prospect before them, should they succeed in
gaining the further bank, than that of
having first to march for yet another four.~
with
teen days through a c o ~ n b where,
notice to the civil authorities duly given,
an English regiment may, indeed, count on
being fed, but out of which the hungry
Russian host could squeeze not a single

day's supplies, and which is intersectecl
by no less than 59 nullahs, five of them
branches of the Iqclus;, then, to cross the
Chenab, no mean river, an ope ratio^^ wit11
which arrnoured steamers, carrying quiclifiring guns, might seriously interfere; atlcl
lastly, to reduce Multan, where our troops
would be concentrated in overwIleImillg
force, and which would certainly, by that
time, have beell stroilgly fortified.'

Route I V
'

From ICandal~arto Rawal Pindi, by Gliazni ancl Iiahul,
the Shutagardan and Peiwar Passes, the ICuram
Valley, Tlial, Kohat, and 1lushalg&2i-dista~~ce, 649
miles.

ThB route may be said to have beet1
'The Gomul does not present the insuperable difficulties
of the Icuram, and cotld be made practicable, thoiigh not
easy, for a column of all arlns ; at the best, it woulcl stiIl
present much steep, broken extent of traclr, and many
narrow passes.'-Siu E. Hamley.
In Hamley's opinion, the issues to this pass might be
fully secured by the erection, at its mouth, of an entrenched
camp, armed with heavy artillery.-1-1. B. H.

invented by Lord Lytton, for it was the
importance which l ~ attached
e
to it, and tile
part which heassigoed tc, it in the strategy
of the second Afghan War, which introduced it to the notice of the vast majority
of Englishmen.
The experience of that
war proved it to be but ' a byway to Kabul
and Ghazni';' and, though its original patron
clung to it to the last, and though Lord
Roberts has pronounced it a road by which
an enterprising commander could, at any
season of the year, push on troops, already
occupying positions in the Huriab Valley
between the Peiwar Mountain and the
Shutagardan, to Kabul 2-an opinion which
Sir John Watson felt it his duty to*challenge "--it would be folly to argue from the
6

Lord Roberts' Memorandum, No. r r ILL., dated

Kabul, 29th May 1880.
Lord Roberts1Memorandum.
' 1 am bound to challenge tlle military advantages of
the IC~~rarn
Route, because I consider that, owing to the
height of the Sl~utagardan,and the extreme cold in winter
2

3
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fact that, in an emergency, a small British
force could cross the latter pass in miclwinter, to the ccrnclusion that a large
Russian army might march a t the same
season of the year from Kabul to the Indus.
The one is an operation of a few clays, the
other of many weeks; ancl though a few
picked men, well-fed ancl clothed, might
spend four or five nights in the snow, without shelter and with the thermometer below
zero, with impunity, what would be the fate
of the unclothed transport animals, and the
half-clad camp-followers, when exposed for
a far longer period to such 'intense cold ?
Their advance would be market1 by many
of t h e features of the French retreat from
Moscow-whol:
companies of men ancl
mules and camels buried in snowdrifts, or
frozen to death in their sleep ; every mile of
between that pass and the Peiwar ICotal, it is no use at all
as a single line.'-Memorandum of Sir J. Watson, dated
I<uram, 24th July 1880.

the road strewn wit11 the bodies of tl1ose
who had perished of fatigue and exhaustion,
or been slain. by rhe rtavage and hardy
tribesmen, who, themselves unseen, would
never lose sight of the invaders, and be
always at hand to swoop down on every
bewildered straggler, every worn-out transport animal, to cut the throat of the one and
carry off the ,burden of the other.
But why,' the impatient reader may
exclaim, 'why try to relieve our fears by
picturing misfortunes which will never overtake our foes, since Russian commanders
are not so mad as to choose the winter for
an advance upon the Indus viri Thal ? '
I admit it, but then that adrnissiGn is
tantamount to an assertion of my belief that
by this route, as by the Gomul and the Thal
Chotiali, they will never invade India at all ;
for if they time their march,' as they undoubtedly must, to reach that river at the
end of the rains, the passes through which
C

they had come would immediately close
behind them, forbidding alilte both succour
and return.
•
Still, granting, for argument's salte, that a
Russian army might some day hazard an
advance on India by the Kuram route in
the hot weather and the rains, its fate woulcl
be harclly more enviable than if it were to
malce the attempt in midwinter.
What
with burning sun and scorching winds between Kandahar and Kabul ; what with the
two great passes, one of them I I, 500 feet
high, and the terrible Hazaar Darakht
Defile ; what with floods, chblera, and fever
in the Kuram ValleyI1 that army must in1 'I tTthe occupation of the I<uramValley] 'has proved very
unhealthy to native troops.'-Lord Roberts' Memorandum.
'General Roberts lays much stress on the great heat
between Jamroocl and Gandamuclr. I am inclined to think
that from 1cohat to Kuram it is, though not quite so bad,
yet nearly equal in temperature. Last year our troops,
marching down tce ICl~yber,suffered terribly. Our troops
did not marc11 down froin Icuram, but the Punjxb contingents did, suffered much fro111 heat, and lost 50 Sepoys
from cholera.'-Sir J. Watson.

\

a

evitably b e thoroughly exhausted before
reaching Thal, where our troops, fresh,
healthy, well-fed, well-equipped, would certainly be awaiting them. And if, to carry
my concessions yet a little further, no
attempt were to be made to destroy the
invaders at this point, and, dragging with
them their innumerable sick, they were to
b e allowed to toil on, unmolested, save by the
savage inhabitants of the neighbouring liills,
who would harass them incessantly, ancl
fatten on their spoils ; ancl if they were t o
possess themselves of Kohat, and to defeat
t h e force mardhing from Peshawar, by way
of the Kohat Pass, which would take them
in flank and rear, and were once "more
to press forward through a rough, barren,
sparsely
region1 t o the Indus at
Kushalgarh, what chance would they have
of ever bridging its stream ? And if, still
adhering t o the policy of leaving Nature to
1

Lord Roberts' Memorandum.

fight our battles, w e were to suffer them to
carry out this operation, they would find
the country on its- left bank no more kindly
or hospitable than that on its right, and be
unable to halt for rest and re-organisation,
much as they would need both before
risking an advance on a gi-eat fortress, that
coulcl not be carried by a co~@-de-mai~z,
and
yet must be captured a t once, if its besiegers
are not all to perish of hunger before its
walls.
Surely I a111 justified in thitllcing that this
unexaggerated picture of the difficulties
which bes& the Kuram road gives rile the
right to erase it also from the list of routes
by %hicll Russia can invade our Indian
Empire ?
' I t is not likely, I~owever,that any strategist invading
India fro111 his base (as it must,be) at Iinbul, would attempt
to operate on a line 1-26 i~lileslong, while we held a parallel
e
b e little fear of an invasion by
one only 104. ~ c e r need
the JCt~ran~
line.'-Sir J. Watson.
'The issue of this pass in our territory at Thal is r o o
miles from that of the I<hyber. A column so strong and
1
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From Kandallar to Peshayr, by Ghazni, and ICabul, and
the ' Latalland, 'the ~ u ~ d a l a l ;and Khyber Passesdistance, qgo miles?

1%

This line of advance is so superior to
all the rest, in that it debouches from the
mountains, not into the deseat like the
Eolan, the Thal Chotiali, and the Gomul,
nor into a rough sterile district like the
Kuram route, but into the cultivated fertile
valley of Peshawar, that it can be no matter
of surprise to LIS to find that it has been
acloptecl by nearly every invader from Alexander to Nadir' Shah.
Except the Thal Chotiali road, it is also
the shortest, nevertheless it is long e&ugh

I

.

well equipped as to be independent c2uld not pass here,
one that could not act independently would scarcely venture ;
and it is not likely, therefore, that any serious attack will
be made by way of the Kuram.'-Sir E. Hamley.
1 There is another road from Kabul to*Jellalabad by the
Khurd Kabul Pass, but this is longer and more tortuous.
Our army used it in the first Afghan War, and began by
using it in the second, but soon abandoned it.-II. I3. H.

.

II

, I
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t o entail upon any force that should advance
by it the same climatic difficulties as have
t o be faced by t h e Icuram. -By it, too, the
Russians would have to suffer from sun and
wind in the summer, from floods in the rains,
and from sickness at most stages of their
journey ; ancl though there is no Shutagardan
to surmount, the Lataband, the Jugdalak,
and IChyher Passes are more difficult and
fatiguing than the Bolan, nor are the tribes
less warlike and greedy of plunder.
There is an open valley at Jellalabad
where the two or three leading regiments
might obtain a few days' sup'plies (we have
already shown that Ghazni and Kabul could
afforb them none), but what are a few days'
supplies for a ,couple of thousands of men
compared to the boundless necessities of a
couple of hundred thousands, on a march
which must kxtencl over several months ?
They would not make the difference of
fifty camels to the transport department.

INDIA'S

N A T U R ~ LDEFENCES
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There are several positions in the passes
which it would be easy t o defend, notably
Lundi Kotal,, a t the w ~ s t e r n end of the
Khyber ; but there would be no need for us
to take advantage of these, since a fortified
camp at the eastern mouth of that pass,
almost within sight of our bas$, Peshawar,
would seal it so effectually, that Sir E.
Hamley was not exaggerating when he said
that he did not see how a single Russian
regiment could ever issue from it ; and this
being the case, I may count the Khyber also
as a route by which no invasioil need be
feared. Nevertheless, so well aware am
I of the existence of persons whose
confidence in Russia's power to accomplish
any object on which she has set her heart,
let Nature oppose her as she may, I shall
have hitherto failed to shake, that I will now
proceed to make assurance doubly sure by
showing the nature of the obstacles to a n
invasion of India which are inherent in the
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constitution of a modern army; and as
the Bola11 route, notwithstanding its great
length, offers the ,advantage that a force
advancing b y it may possibly retain its
communications for a short time after entering the country which it has come to
wrest from .us, o r at least to raise against
us, that shall be the road along which I now
invite my readers to follow the fortunes of
our Russian friends, though not denying
to them the liberty t o use other lines of
advance in combination with this one,
should there appear to be any advantage
to them in cloing so.

C H A P T E R I11

I

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT
4

I

already let it appear that I believe
the whole question of the feasibility of a
Russian invasion of India to hinge upon
considerations of supply ancl transport, but
before addressing myself to this subject, i t
will be i~ecessaryto determine the size of
the army for which supplies and transport
will have t o be provided, dividing it into
four categories :-first,
troops garrisoning
Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul-in a word,
0
occupying Afghanistan ; seconclly, troops
engaged in lreeping open communications
between Herat and Kandahay and between
the base or bases of operations and, the
armies in the field; thirdly, troops actually
IIAVE
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taking part in the invasion ; fourthly, troops
in reserve.
In the first category .we must place not
less than 40,000 men, viz. ~ o , o o oat Herat,
10,ooo at Kandafiar, and 20,000 at Kabul,
this larger figure being made necessary by
the fierce afld fanatical character of the
people of that city, and also by the fact
that, during six months of the year, its
garrison must be self-sufficing, as, both the
road to the nortl~and that to the west
being closed by snow, there would be no
possibility of reinforcing it either from the
Oxus or from Kandal~ar.
The lines of con~munication would
absol-b, at a moderate computation, 30,ooo
men ; and, considering the wear and tear to
which the invading armies would be subjected on their march, and the nature of the
opposition that they must be prepared to
encounter at the end of it, ~ ~ o , o owill
o not
be too many to assign for the actual in-

SUPPLY AND. TRANSPORT
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vasion of India, supposing one route only
t o be used, or 200,000 if two routes, or
230,000 if three routes are used; for it
must not be forgotten that, on the two latter
suppositions, although our troops, like those
of Russia, would be divided, our power of
concentration would be great, w d theirs, nid.
Finally, a reserve of 50,000 men would b e
necessary, since, in case of disaster, not a
soldier could be taken from the garrisons or
from the lines of communication, either for
the purpose of reinforcing the defeated
army or of covering its retreat.
Thus, assuming that the advance will
take place by the Bolan alone, we shall
have 270,000 fighting men and2taking
the proportion of camp-follpwers, which our
campaigning experience has shown to be
indispensable, viz. I 0,000 to every I I , 500
soldiers-2 34,782 non-combatants to feed,
during a period of time which would ceytainly extend from three months before the
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actual advance on India until the invading
force, having possessed itself of Multan,
might be at last i~ a qosition to supply
some, at least, of its own wants on the spot.
The whole of this calculatioll might be
worked out, but to follow me through it
would b e sp great a weariness to the
reader, that I shall confine lnyself to showing what would be the amoullt of supplies,
expressed in camel-loads, which the I 50,ooo
men of the field army must carry with
them from Randahar to Multan by Jacobabad ; and, a s time is a chief factor in
this calculation, my first step will be to
ascertain how long it will talte the aforesaid
150,om men to accomplish this march.
T h e distance from Kandahar to Dadar, at
the south-east mouth of the Bolan, is twenty,
from Dadar to Jacobabad eight, from Jacobabad to Multan twenty-two marches, fifty in
all, and the speed a t which the invaders can
advance will be regulated by the number

1

-i
I
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of men who can pass through the narrowest
portion of the road in a day.'
Notl~ing
would be gained 'by sending them from
Kandahar t o Quetta in bodies of say 6000
men, if, on arriving at the latter town, each
body had t o be divided into two, of which
the second must wait a day before it could
follow the first; indeed, in many respects
the advance would be easier if macle in two
As there are persons to whom the truth of this axiom
may not be self-evident, I will prove it by a simple example.
s e bodies of twelve men each, the first, A,
Let us s ~ ~ p p o two
marching in line, the second, B, in single filc, moving at auniform pace, and in such a way that the line A is parallel with
the lending mnn of file 13, to be approaching two gateways,
through each of which only one Inan can pass a t a time ;at
the rate of five seconds to each man, it will take each body
sixty seconds, or one minute, to clear its gateway; but, if
body A has widener1 out into line once more, it will resume
its march, no longer parallel with the leading man of body
13, but with its last man, and every Lime a similar gateway
had to be traversed it would be attended by a loss of
fifty-five seconds, so that it would graduaIly fall behind
body B. If, instead of a gateway, 'narrow lanes were
entered, each body would remain in the single file formation, and neither would have gained any advantage over
the oLher.-H. B, H.

detachments, a day's march apart, from the
outset.
I will take 3000 troops, that means 3000
fighting men, with their accompanying
camp-followers and transport animals, as the
highest number that can enter the Bolan in
any one day,
This will divide our invading army into
fifty detachments, each a day's march behind
its predecessor ; to these fifty days we must
add fifty more for the distance to b e traversed, and the result will be IOO days as
the shortest possible time in which to move
a force of rSo,ooo men, with all its trains,
supplies, and followers, from Kandahar to
Multah ancl concentrate it there, ancl 75 as
the average nupber of days during which
each detachment woulcl require to be fed,
either on the march or whilst waiting at the
encl of it for the whole army to be once more
reunited ; and we are now in a position to determine the amount of transport with which

I
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it must be furnished, taking, as tlie basis
of our calculations, with the omission of the
small decimal, '05, the very low scale which
Major Hough tells us was in force ir7. the
army of the Inclus in the year 1839, viz. one
camel, or two mules, for the conveyance of the
food of every fighting man for tbirty days l1 This estimate gives only 2 lbs. of rice or flour, it Ib.
dhal, & lb. ghee, and a little salt, per diem, to every fighting
m a n or government camnp-follower, and I lb. flour or rice,
p Ib. dhal and a little salt, to each private follower. In
Sir Donald Stewart's force in 1878-79,where the diet boll1
for troops a n d camp-followers was more liberal, the proportion of camels to fighting men was as I man to 1'18
camels, but e v e n in this calculation no provision is made
for the carriage of meat, or spirits, or tea, or sugar, or
hospital comforts of any kind for the men, nor yet for compressed hay f o r the horses, nor far grain for the transport
animals. In a n Anglo-Indian division of 12,500n1en RI which.
only the Europeans receive meat, theybeing in the proportion
of seven Englishmen to sixteen natives, less than one to two,
1000 sheep ancl 820 b~~lloclrs
are consumed per mensem.
Therefore, t h e requirements of an army of 15o,ooo, ineat
being consumed by them in the same proportion, woulcl
demand 12,000 sheep and 9840 bullocksfor one inonlli, ancl
30,000 sheep and 24,600 bulloclrs for two months and a half,
o r its equivalent in tinned meat, for the carriage of which
mules or camels must be provided.-H. B. H.

the term iighting man to be ullderstood to
include, not only the soldier himself, but his
share of the camp-i;olloi@ersand his portion
of all the cavalry horses and gun cattle
belonging to the force. Two simple proportion sums will give us the inforination we
need; the first tells us that as thirty days'
supplies are to I camel, so are seventy-five
days' supplies to two and a half camels;
the second tells us that as one man is to
two and a half camels, so are I ~ o , o o omen
to 375,000 camels, or to double that number
of mules-in other words, that it will require
;375,000 camels, or 750,000 mules to carry
the barest necessaries of life for the Russian
armyewhich should attempt to invade India
vi2 the Bolan.
Next we must make provision for the
carriage of tents, hospitals and all their miscellaneous eqcipments ; for the solclikrs' and
officers' kits, for cooking utensils, entrenching
tools, stable gear, palthals (sltins for the con-
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veyance of water), for ammunition, for sappers' and heavy gun equipments, for engineer
and artillery parks, for pogttoon train, and for
the thousand and one etceteras without which
a modern army cannot stir. In the Afghan
W a r of I 878-79-80, our artillery and engineer
parks were very light, and we ha4 no regular
pontoon train, just a few pontoons, yet the proportion of transport for all the impedimenta,
which may be classed under the general
name of baggage, was -574 camel for each
fighting man. W e will make it half a camel,
which will add under this head ;'5,000
camels, or 150,ooo mules, to the transport
engaged in carrying food ; and lastly, if the
whole expedition is not to brealr down-long
before it reaches the Pishin Valley, provision
must be made for the feeding of the transport animals themselves.
In the first phase of the second Afghan
War, when such provision was neglected, the
Bengal army alone lost 50,000 hired camels,
D

besides a large number belonging to Government ; how many mules and ponies I have
not been able to ascertdn, but the mortality
among them must have been great, since,
on the renewal of the war in September
1879, it was found that the whole of the
original tragsport had practically disappeai-ed,
and India had to be scoured, from the
Punjab to the Delrkan, to provide carriage
of any descriptioi~ for the small British
armies advancing on Kabul. Experience,
however, had worked repentance, and repentance, amendment ; for, during the second
phase of the war, 6 lbs. of grain per diem
was allowed to each transport animal,
whether camel, mule, or pony-an extremely
moderate alloyance, below which it would
not be safe for the Russians to go.'
I must insist again on the fact that there is, practically,
no forage along this, or any other route through Afghanistan.
When travellers talk of plenty of grazing for camels on certain stages of this or that journey, they have in their minds
the Icafilas, which, at certain' seasons of the year, traverse

.
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Six pouilcls of grain per diem for 450,000
camels = 2,700,000 Ibs.: which figure n~ultiplied by 75, the number .of days for which
we have to provide, gives 2 0 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 lbs.
as the amount of grain that will have to
accompany the army of the Bolan ; ancl as a
camel is reckoned to carry four ,mauncls, or
320 lbs., and a mule half that load, we must
add to our former iigures 632,812 camels, or
the Afghan passes, and which number perhaps 1000 or 1500
camels. For these there inay now and again be sufficient
forage; but let not 1500 but If;,ooo pass along the same
road, and there will not be a bite left for the hundreds of
thousands that, in the case of a great army, have still to
follow. And even where forage of some kind exists, I can
affirm, from my own experience, that there is frequently no
time for grazing. On the march, of course, there can be
no halting; full or starving, the unhappy beasts, strung
together nose to tail in one long line, must struggle on till
the camping-ground is reached, often-too late for their
drivers, after removing their burdens, to take them out to
feed. I have seen hundreds of camels sink. down when
relieved of their loads, which they had borne for nine or
ten hours at a stretch, and die of hunger and fatigue, or
fall dead on the march, leaving their burdens to be piled
on the backs of their already overweighted companions.H. B. W.

1,265,624 mules, when our calculatioil will

stand thus :For carriage of faod:
,1
,1
baggage,
$1
,, grain,
Grand total,

.*

.

Carncls

h1 ulrs.

375,000
75,000
632,812

750,000

.-,

1,082,812

1~0,000

--

1,265,624

2,165,624

Of course camels carrying grain can no
more live without food than camels carrying supplies or baggage, but I need hardly
pursue these calculatio~lsfurther, the figures
at which we have already arrived being, I
vetlture to hope, sufficient to convince all
sane minds that India has notl~ingto fear
from such a force as Sir E. Hamley was
contemplating when he wrote : ' Wc may
b e assured that an invading army of India,
such as we c ~ n n o tafford to clespise, will be
no ilnprovised force, no barbarous horde,
but truly formidable in numbers, organisation, and le'adership.' Strong as this part
of my case is, however, I will yet call my
reader's attention to the fact that in the
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movement of these 280,000 men-150,000
combatants and I 30,000 non-combatantsand these 1,082,8I 2 *camels, I have allowed
for not a single hitch, for not one day's
delay.
And what delays, what hitches
there would be, should the problem we are
considering ever be transferredqfrom paper
to real life ! Delays from the sudden floods
which sweep down the Bolan, from sickness,
from the sheer exhaustion of the heavily
laden and underfed cattle, from collisions
with the Tribesmen-above all, from the confusion which, do what one may, must reign
it1 so great a multitude, cooped up in a
narrow space, and struggling, up-hill and
down-hill, over rough and stony ground.
What the siclrness would be, it is appalling
to contemplate, for the condition of the roads,
and still more of the camping-grounds, would
be one of indescribable filth ; >nd when, to
1 Surgeon-General Alexander Smith, C.B., in his admisable report on the Medical Administration of the Afghan
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t h e ordinary effluviz polluting the air, we
add that arising froin the carcasses of the
dead beasts with v~hiclithe road woulcl soon,
be strewn, who can doubt that cholera, dysentery and fever would soon be rife among
t r o o ~ sand camp-followers, ancl that many
a halt wo~dd become necessary to succour
the sick and bury the dead ? As for collisions with the Tribesmen, I know it is the
fashion, in alarmist circles, to take it for
granted that the Russians would advance
through a friendly population, uilharassed
and unopposecl, but I have never been .able
to discover the smallest ground for the

l
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Campaign, refers to the extremely foul state of the campinggrounds from their previous occupation by ICafilas, and
tells of the difficulty which the small British force, which
h e accompanied u p i h e Bolan, experienced, in finding any
hitherto unused plot of land on which to pass the night,
and how, on one occasion, it had to descend into the
shingly bed of tae stream, where the water lay at a very
short distance beneath the surface, and pitch its camp there,
at the risk of its sharing the fate of the sappersl camp
in the first Afghan War, which was swept away by a
freshet.--1-1. U. H.
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assumption. T h e hatred of Englishmen
which is said, perhaps truly, to burn fiercely
in every Afghan heart, is not of Englishmen
as Englishmen, in contradistitlction to other
Europeans and Christians, but as members
of the State which has twice carried famine
and slaughter through their land; and if
there is such a thing as persistency in
national character, or in human nature
itself, nothing is more certain than that
the moment the Russians enter Afglianistan,
as we e~lteredit, sword in hand, they will
be regarded with the same abhorrence, and
meet with the same opposition.
What
Prince Lebanoff said of Shere Ali-' He
was neither Russian nor British, but an
Afghan, anxious to preservc the independence of his country '-is true of every Afghan
to-clay; and our own experience of the
difficulties attendant on twc attempts to
subjugate them should save us from underestimating those which certainly await the

1
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Russians sl~ouldthey ever venture on the
same taslr.
But the plundel* of India! that dazzling
bait, which Russia will flash before the eyes
of Asia; which, according to Sir C. MacGregor, is to draw to her banners ' every
ruffian from$he Caspian to the Indus, whose
shoe-leather would hold out long enougll t o
enable hiin to join them,' will it not disarm
Afghan hostility ? will not Ghilzais and
Duranis, I<alrars, and Afridis sweep down
upon the rich plains of the Punjab a n d
satisfy, at one and the same time, their
greed and their revenge? Honestly, I d o
not think they will, not from laclr of inclination, perl~aps,but from lack of power. Eve11
rufFians must eat to live, and how these
volunteers are to get food, seeing that a l l
the grain of central Asia and Afghanistan
wiIl have been swept into the Russian
granaries, and how they are to carry supplies if they could obtain them, when e v e r y
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four-footed creature that can bear a load
on its baclc will have been seized for the
Russian transport service, it is hard to understand. But supposing these little difficulties overcome, and that every ruffian has
his camel or his mule to carry his supplies
and supplies for it to carry, will&hesehordes
be more welcome allies in the van of the
invading army, or in its rear ? In the van,
like a swarm of locusts, they will strip the hillsides of every leaf, the valleys of every blade
of grass, with which the Russian comrnissariat and transport departments had hoped
to elce out the insufficient grain allowance of
some at least of their unhappy beasts; in
the rear, they will soon discover that it is
easier and more profitable &o lay hands on
the wealth moving before their eyes, or
abandoned by the wayside, than to toil
through the desert in the wildohope of looting British India.
T h e Russians, if they are wise, will decline

.
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the services of all such untrustwortl~yauxiliaries, and keep them a t a distance by very
summary measures-; a d if, as MacGregor
anticipated, they succeed in raising a body
of 20,000 fighting men in Afghanistan, these
will form part of the regular forces whose
fortunes we 11ave been tracing, and share t h e
difficulties which we have shown illust prove
fatal to their enterprise.
But belief in the impossible dies hard, and
the statesmen and military men, and still
more the general public, with whom the
possibility of a Russian invasion of India
has long been an article of faith, driven
from the roads, will, I am well aware, fall
back upon railways. A chorus of voices
will remind me that before Russia will
address herself to the invasion of India,
she will have smoothed the way for the
advance of h'er armies by the construction
of railways on a gigantic scale. From the
Caspian to Herat, from Herat to Kandahar,
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from Kandahar t o 'Kabul, and thence on
to Gundamak in the one direction, and to
the foot of tlie Khfvaja Amran range (it is
Sir C. MacGregor's guidance that I a m
f ~ l l o w i n g ) ,there
~
would be one unbroken
line, along which soldiers 'and stores will be
forwarded swiftly and safely when the hour
shall strike for Russia to carry into effect
the plans, which she is credited with having
nourished for the last hundred years or
more.
I will not stop to calculate, even in the
roughest manner, what such a programme
would cost in time and money, but accept
the axiom of Sir C. MacGregor, that where
1 ' Russian railways would have been made from Farah
to the west foot of the IChojak, as far as possible from the
Oxus towards Kabul, and from 1~ab;l to Gundamuclr, and
from Kabul to Kandahar, and from this line to the head of
the Gomul. A good cart road would have been made
from Herat to Kabul direct, from U s h to Chitral, and on
down the Kunar valley ' (MacGregor). These vast preparations would entail the construction of about 1800 miles
of railway and 1650 miles of cart road through barrqn,
regions and over lofty mountains.-H. B. H.

I

warlilre objects are in question, money is
always forthcoming. Assuming, then, that
the necessary number of millioils has been
flung into this gulf, ancl that, at the end
of a given time, say twenty years from
to-day, his railway scheme has been realised,
we will now bquire what influence this fact
would exercise on the amount of supplies
ancl transport which the invading army must
carry with it from Kandahar, or find awaiting
it at Quetta, where we will suppose the
terainus of the line to be. If, by making
use of the railway up to that point, a saving
of time were effected, there might be a
corresponding diminution under these heads.
But how do the facts stand ?
It takes roo drains, with an average of
30 vehicles per train, to move an English
division of I 2,500 men of all arms, with
their haggage,'tents, and ammunition, etc.,
and with full transport for the conveyance
of the said impedimenta, but with no siege
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or pontoon train, and without supplies either
for troops, cavalry horses, gun cattle, or
baggage animals. .To ,move 150,000 men,
under the same conditions, 1 2 0 0 trains
would be required. Now, nine up and
nine down trains is the greatest number
that can be run on our military lines, beyond
the frontier ; but I will supp&e Russia to
possess more rolling-stock and to manage
her traffic better than we do, and that she
will therefore be able to run twelve trains
each way in the twenty-four- hours, instead
of nine, on which basis it will take her
exactly IOO days to bring her army from
Kandahar and concentrate it at the point
where its march must begin, whither a
portion of its supplies will have preceded it
4
by train, whilst the remainder will be pouring in by road ; the proportion of train-borne
and camel-carried supplies being determined
by the amount of transport which will be
required when the army starts from its new
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base, for as the transport animals, except
t h e ./~,oooallotted to the baggage, which
accompany the troops (be it noted, in passing, that this figure requires doubling, as
mules would have to be substitutecl. for
carnels),l must perforce make the whole
journey on foot, it would be a waste of
power t o 1ef them perform its first stage
Under any circumstances much of the transport nlust
consist of mules, ponies, and bullocks, not only on account
of the impossibility of procnring the enormous number or
camels that woulcl be required, but also because the latter
animal is ill-adapted to a journey which begins in the liighlands of Afghanistan and ends in the deserts of Beluchistan.
' It was ordered,' wrote Sir Michael Kennedy, ControllerGeneral of Transport and Supply, in his valuable Report of
OcLober 6th, 1880, 'that preference should be given to
mules and ponies, restricting as nlucb as possible the
acquisition of camels ; for the experience of the prcvious
campaign had demonstrated that the camel of the plains
was unsuited for tly; hard work and rigorous climate
baggage animals would have to endure
in northern
Afghanistan! [This is as true of the camel of the plains of
t h e Oxus as of his, kinsmen of the plains of t h e Indus.]
' Subsequent experience has also shown that the hill camel
is very little better, at least in our hands ' [would Russian
hands be gentler ? ] ' and in the manner we are compelled
to work him with troops.'-H. B. H.
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unladen, so that only such supplies as
exceed their carrying capacity will have
been previously acc~mu1,atedat Quetta.'
Now, as Kaildahar is twelve marches
from Quetta, I 50,ooo men, marching in
bodies of 3000, would concentrate a t the
latter town a n the 62nd day, and the
average during which the whol; force would
require to be fed, either moving or waiting,
would be 37 as against 50 if the journey
were performed by rail ; and a force marching by road to Quetta would have an
advantage over a force conveyed thither
Return of the Russian Army of the Bolan, as moved
by rail, calculated on the basis of an Anglo-Indian
division :Nan-Corn.
O1Ticers. Officers, rank Followers.
and file.

7500

142,500

Cavalry
Horses and
gun cnttls.

for stck.

130,000

In India we allow sick carriage(Dhoo1ies and Dhandies) at

5 per cent. for troops and I per cent, for followers.-H.B.H.

by rail as regards time, which means for
the latter an absolute increase in supplies,
whilst in the m a t f e r of transport the decrease, if any, would be so small as to
exercise no appreciable influence upon the
problem we are trying to so1ve.l
But even if the balance of advantages
were the o?her way, it would be unwise
to move an army by rail in a country
where, owing to the nature of the ground
and of the climate, landslips and floods are
of frequent occurrence, and where warlike
tribes, hungry for spoil and enraged at the
'Railways arc undoubtedly wanting in some of the
characteristics of a good line of co~nmunication; we should
regard them as nothing beyond excellent lines of supply.
They can never supersede tlie ordinary roads in war, as
these are indispensgble for inarching and manceuvring,
and are the only lines by which an army, compelled to
retire, can fall back on its reinforcements a n d reserves!The Organisation and Ad~ninistrationof Lines of Co7;lz~lz?inicationi g z Ww, by Colonel G. H. Furse, C.B. The
Etappen or Staging system, like the railway, could be used
only as far as Quetta, and would give little relief to the
transport.--13. B. H.
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occupation of their territories, would border
the line in its whole length, to guard against
whose raids it musb be, strongly patrolled
from end to end, by night as well as by
day. However slrilful the Russian engineers, however vigilant the troops on the
communication, it would be little short of
a miracle if bridges were not swept away
or destroyed, embankments undermined or
torn down, and rails pulled up, to the swift
and complete dislocation of the whole of
the military arrangements.
Once again I venture to believe that a
study of the figures belonging to this branch
of the subject will relieve the fears of those
who, from ignorance of the actual facts of
military railway transit, havs allowed themselves to be persuaded that the Russians
are only waiting for the extension of their
lines into Afghanistan to burnt like a resistless torrent through the passes and spread
themselves over Northern India. Even if

a railway could hasten, instead of putting
back the hour of the arrival of the invading
army at Quetta, an zccurnulation of men
and animals is not like an acculnulation of
water, which gathers strength, as it rises.
Let any number of troops you will accumulate in a defile, they call only issue from it
in a slender and harmless stream ; and the
same is true of the desert through which
the Itldus must be approached, whether the
advance take place by the Gomul, the
Thal Chotiali, or the Bolan. Nevertheless,
I will now consider the whole question of
the Invasion of India from the point of
view of the Defence, as I have hitherto
considered it from the point of view of
the Attack, %it11 the object of showing
that the frontier which we abandoned when
Lorcl Lytton occupied Quetta, and which,
year by y e a r and month by month, we are
leaving further and further behind us, is the
strongest with which any land has ever
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been endowed, and the one which lends itself
,most kindly to the far-reaching plans of the
:strategist and the swift and sudden movements of the tactician.

. .
C H A P T E R IV
THE DEFENCE

HAVING
e x m i n e d the obstacles offered by
Nature to a Russian invasion of India, and
those which are inherent in the constitution
of a large modern army, it remains to consider the artificial barrier against which that
army's last strength would b e spent-in
other words, to indicate the steps which the
Indian Government would have to take to
complete the work of disintegration and
destruction which our allies, Fatigue and
Siclrness, Hunger and Thirst, would have
so well begun. Those steps need not be
taken in haste-haste
is often a blunderer
and always 5 spendthrift -for we should
have ample warning of the intended attack.
T h e preparations for it would be on so
D8
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gigantic a scale and so far-reaching in their
effects, that concealment would be out of
the question; even the line it was to follow
could not continue long in doubt, since the
immense distances between the different
routes, and the urgent need that must exist
in so poor a country as Afghanistan to
start the troops and their endless train of
followers and transport animals as soon
as possible on their march towards our
frontier, would compel the Russian commanders to make their choice quicltly, and
also to abstain from feints, manceuvres
belonging rather to tactics than to strategy
and quite inadmissible where the deceptive
movement would remove the feinting force
hundreds of miles from the road it was
ultimately to pursue, and add enormously to
commissariat and transport difficulties, as
well as to those arising frsm the very
narrow time limits within which the advance
could be made at all.

And if our preparations need not be made
i n haste, neither need they be on a gigantic
scale, and I do not' say this under the
vulgar British delusion that one Englishman is as good as a dozen foreigners; I
have every respect for Russian soldiers and
for Russiaih generals, and, were we called
upon to meet them on equal terms, I should
agree wit11 Sir C. MacGregor that we ought
to stand towards them in a relation of
ilumerical superiority ; but there would be
no equality between our men, fresh, healthy,
well supplied with every necessary ancl coinfort, and the weary, hungry, sicltly Russian
troops ; and still less equality between their
position, toiling in small parties through
a waterless1 desert, with their transport
Poor in water as Nature has made the desert of
Beluchistan, it y u l d be our business to make it poorer
still. The moment it became a certainty that a Russian
army was on its way from Kandahar, the inhabitants of
Dadar and all the villages on the caravan route would be
removed, with their scanty belongings, to a place of safety
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animals perishing by thousands, and their
supplies running out day by day-and ours,
behind the strong defences of Jacobabad,
able to issue thence at will, and to overwheIm each detachment before the next
could come to its aid.
T h e following table gives the number of
troops that I believe would be fouild quite
adequate for the defence of our frontier,
supposing the bulk of the Russian army
to succeed in reaching it, ancl their dispositions on the hypothesis that its line of
advance 'would be the Bolan.
beliincl our line of defence, whilst their growing crops
would be destroyed a n d all their wells blown up or filled
in. During the continuance of the campaign these poor
people ~vouldb e lcept in cornfort, and at its close restored
to their homes with a n ample sup?ly of seed-corn, and
provisions to keep them till the new crops could be reaped,
our engineers having first reopened the wells. Of course
the Russians could reopen them too, but at the cost of
much time-some of them are ninety fiet deep-and time
woulcl be the one t h i a g of most importance t o them.H. B. H
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DISTRIBUTION O F BRITISH ARMY O F
DEFENCE.

. .

Men.

16 CavaIry Regiments, . 7,200
4 Batteries, R.H.A.,
.
600
24 Infantry Regiments, . 18,000
4 Batteries, R.A.,
,
600
Companies of ~appers,
300
Reinforcements for ordinary garrison,
,
5,000

I
I

1

I

24

24

- -

24 Infantry Regiments,

Sukkur.

Gunq

31,700

48

18,000
600
zoo

24

-

-

18,800

24

.

4 Batteries, Field Artillery,
2 Companies of Sappers,
Armoured Steamers
carrying quick-firing
guns, .

.

4 Cavalry Regiments,
1,800
I Battery, R.H.A.,
.
150
Rajan~ur 1 2 Infantry Regiments, . 9,000
Or at
2 Field Batteries,
300
mtha*ot* 3 Companies of ~appers, 300

.

-

6
12

7

11,550

18

Carried forward, 62,050

go
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Men.

Brought forward, 62,050
4 Cavalry Regiments,

.

Battery, R.H.A.,
.
12 Infantry Regiments, .
Dera Ghazi
~
h
~2 Field
~ Batteries,
,
.
3 Companies of Sappers,

I

I

1,800
150
9,000
300
300

6
12

-

-

11,550

18

.
.
.

3,600
300
18,000
Goo

. .22,500

I

4 Cavalry Regiments,
I Battery R.H.A.,
12 Infantry Regiments,
2 Fielcl Batteries,

.

Total,

12

24

36

1,800
150
9,000
300

12

. 1og,3t;o

162

.
.

. .

L

go

rn

8 Cavalry Regiments,
2 Batteries R.H.A,,
24 Infantry Regiments,
4 Field Batteries,

Lahore.

Guns.

6

- -

T h e map which will be kund at the
beginning of this Tract shows, in a clear
and simple manner, the extraordinary

I
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strategic excellence of the position which
I have supposed our troops to occupy,
every post fronr Pesllawar to Sukkur
supporting and being supported by its
neighbour, and all alilte being able to draw
with speed and safety upon the great: arsenals
of Rawal Findi and Multan for military
stores, and upon the rich country lying
around Lahore for grain and flour, whilst
every district has its ow11 ample supply of
corninissariat cattle.
Sukkur and Jacobabad, where the largest concentration of
troops occurs, are doubly fortunate, in that
they can also supply their needs with
equal ease from Karachi and Bombay;
and the same happy combination of road,
rail, and river, which maltes the supply
and transport question as s&implein our
case a s it is difiicult in Russia's,' will give
The Indus railway has but a single line, and runs
through a barren land ; yet it can by no means be classed
with the hypothetical Russian Icandahar-Quetta railway

1
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to our commanders the power of modifying
their dispositions at an hour's notice to
meet any change in the Russian plan of
advance, such, for instance, as the diversion
of a portion of the invading force from the
Bolan to the Thal Chotiali route, or an
abandonment of the march og Jacobabad
in favour of one on the Indus ferry at
Mithankot.
The collection and distribution of stores
would be, of course, the Government of
India's first concern, and every military
post, from Peshawar to Sukkur, ought to
as a hindrance rather than a help to the movement of
troops ; because, firstly, running in either direction from
any one of the strategical points which will require to be
supplied and occupied, the pressure upon its cariying
capacity is divided ; because, secondly, it does not stop
short half-way ; because, thirdly, it is supplemented all
along its course by a fair road and a splendid waterway;
because, fourthly, the force to be moved by it is small in
comparison wit11 the Russian army o f 0 ~ ~ o , o omen
o ; and
fifthly, because it lies entirely within our own territories,
and is in no danger from the inhabitants, nor, except in the
rains, from natural causes.--H. B. H.

have a couple of months' supplies in hand
before the movement of the troops begins ;
and they, in their turn,chaving full command
of trains and steamers (a steamer and its
accompanying flat will convey a whole
infantry regiment with its baggage downstream, a t t$e rate of from ten to fifteen
miles an hour) should be carried to their
respective destinations with such regularity
and despatch, that there would be no
necessity to expose them to siclrness by
moving them before the rains had ceased,
t h e floocls subsided, and the danger to
health from the concentration of large
bodies of men had, to a great extent, disappeared. There should be no difficulty
in throwing 4 c ~ oto 5000 men daily into
Sulrkur, supposing them to make use of
both river and rail, 'and to come partly
from the Bombay Presidency, or from
England direct, and partly from Multan
and Lahore, where they would be replaced

4
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by troops drawn from stations farther
south; and they could be pushed on to
Jacobabad, by rail and ,road, certainly at
the rate of 3000 a day. T h e transport
that would afterwards be required by the
army in the field would more than suffice
for the conveyance of the food and baggage of the regiments sent by road, as
the distance between the two towns is so
short, only 45$ miles, that the cavalry, at
least, could accomplish it in two marches.
Jacobabad, the point where, as a reference to the map will show my readers, the
Russiall forces and our own must come into
contact, is a strategical position of extraordinary importance, which we will suppose
to have been rendered thoroqgl~lystrong by
military science and skill. Standing on the
edge of the desert, it completely covers
both the railway and the raised causeway
which connect it with Sultltur; and it also
commands the road from Dadar, the frontier

road to Rajanpur, and the difficult and
circuitous track from Quetta, pi2 Kelat
and the Mula Pass, which joins the Dadar
route at Rajhan, one march north-west of
Jacobabad, of which the Russia~ls might
avail themselves in order to relieve the
congestion .consequent on the passage of
vast multitudes through a single narrow
defile. Here, in addition to an extraordinary garrison of 5000, I have placed a
force of 26,700 men of all arms, specially
strong in cavalry and horse artillery, whose
part it will be to push forward into the
desert as far as Rajhan, where it will
effectually hinder a junction of the invaders,
supposing a portion of them to have been
sent vid Kela,t, and will be ready to fall
upon them at their weakest moment, when
exhausted by fatigue and tormented with
thirst, after a terrible march of 264 miles.
Day by day, as each Russian detachment
straggles into sight, it will be attacked in

I

1

;-

.

THE DEFGNCE

*
I

.1L -,

79

front by the infantry and artillery in extended order, and taken in flank by the
cavalry, whilst a couple of regiments will be
told off to sweep in such baggage as has
escaped the ceaseless raids of our Beluch
levies and of the Maris, Bughtis, and other
predatory tribes, whose natural love of
plunder will have been stimulated by
promises of ample reward for services
rendered to the British cause. A special
service of mules, moving conti~lually between the fortress and the camp, will keep
our army well supplied with food, water,
and forage for the horses.
Were there no Jacobabad to forbid all
issue from the desert, Sulclcur, where the
North-West Railway crosses, the Indus by
a magnifiwnt cantilever bridge covered by a
strong ttte dejont, and defended, probably, by
armoured steamers carrying quick-firing gulls,
would be quite equal to the task of guarding
the passage of that river, since, in addition to
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the desert, it is protected by broad marshes
ancl by a perfect network of inundation canals.
As things are, S p k k ~ r ' sonly function will
be to give shelter t o troops-all infantry and
artillery-who may be required to reinforce
Jacobabad or Rajanpur ; for how are the
Russians to
get near it, even supposing
h
us to have no army in the field? They
cannot take Jacobabad by a coup de main ;
with starvation staring them in the face,
they cannot afford time to reduce it by regular
siege operations ; they cannot invest it and
cut off its supplies, because its calmon protect
the railway and the road, and they cannot get
behind it, except by the railway or the road,
without plunging into a fetid s w a n ~ p . ~T h e
0

< T h ecountry as far,,as the eye could r e e h was a level
swampy plain covered withp low aquatic jungle and marsh
grass.'--Report of Surgeon-General A. Smith, C.B.
'At the timc! of the passage of bur troops the water had
subsided, hut the neighbourhood of the path was swampy,
ancl in places very fetid, especially from putrid fishes left
dry on the cessation of the inundations.'-Bid.
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only course left open to their commander is
to mask Jacobabad, which he will hardly
venture to do with less ethan 50,000 men,
and, by malring a detour through the desert,
to reach the frontier road and march on the
ferry at Mithanltot, 133 miles away, with
the certainty that before l ~ ecan2rrive there
the division at Rajanpur will have been
quadrupled in strength by reinforcements
sent from Lahore, Multan, and Sukliur, and
that the armoured steamers are following
l ~ i smovements and may be counted on to
prevent his ever throwing a pontoon across
the 1ndus.l
But no general, with hunger and disease
decimating his ranlrs, and called upon each
day to repel the attaclrs of as vigorous and
active endny, will ever mask Jacobabad and
march on Mithankot. ? His real choice, if
he ever got within sight of the former place,
The Indus is deep at all seasons o f the year, and
between Dera Ghazi IChan and Sukkur there are no fords.
P

would be between ,surrender and retreat ;
and, considering the awful nature .of the
sufferings which would await the hapless
multitudes, armed and unarmed, committed
to his charge, were he to embrace the latter
alternative, there can be little doubt that
he would accept the former, when, indeed,
trouble and danger would begin for us
- trouble in filling such innumerable
moutl~s, da'nger from the typhoid and
cholera that would be raging among our
p-isoners.
Against these two sources of danger I
should warn the Indian Government t o
make timely and ample provision, were it
not that, as must be the case with all the
preparations I- have been describing, that
provision would be made in vair> Again,
and with redoubled rboldness, I repeat m y
conviction, that we shall never have a
Russian invasion of India to repel,
There is no rz~shz.It,finto such a military
CI
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enterprise as the one I have been picturing to
my readers ; its details must be worlred out, its
cost counted, years before it can be begun.
The strength of the British position would
be well known to the Russian strategists
intrusted with the drawing up of the plan
of campaign, and their own annals can assist
7
them to judge of the condition in which
their troops would arrive before it. Kaufmann's march upon Khiva, in the spring of
r 873, when he and all his force were oilly
saved from dying of thirst and fatigue
by the timefy intervention of a ' ragged
Kirghiz,' who led them to some wells, and
when, out of 10,000 camels, only 1 2 0 0 lived
to reach the Oxus; and the experience of
the two columils which were despatched, the
one from"rashkend to Jam, the other from
Petro-Alexandrovska tr, Charjui, in June
1878, would sufice to lead thein to correct
conclusions on this crucial point, even without the two object-lessons with which
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England has kindly furnished them in
Afghanistan itself.
That Bengal cdumn of the Indus army
of 1839, of which mention has twice been
made, must have reckoned on reaching
Kandahar within a month and a half, for i t
took with it from Sukkur supplies for that
length of time only, but it spent exactly
nine weelzs on the way; and from this miscalculation and from the incessant raids of
Beluchis and Afghans, who carried off the
laden camels from under the very noses of
their escorts, it was reduced to the direst
straits. During 48 days the mustered
establishment (Government followers who,
in the beginning, received the same allowance as the troops) were .on half rations, and
t h e troops themselves were on +he same
footing during 28 days ; whilst, for the latter
period of t i d e , the private camp-followers,
t o whom, from the outset, only half t h e
soldier's meagre fare was allotted, were
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mulcted of the haIf even of that miserable
pittance, and had to keep body and soul
together on 4lb. of flour .and ioz. of dhal per
diem.l The cavalry and artillery horses
had had no grain for 27 days, and were in
such a state of weakness on arriving at
Icandahar that not a single troop was fit for
detached duty.' History is silgnt as to the
diet on which the transport animals were
expected to bear their burdens, but it has
preserved for us the fact that the 13,ooo
men composing the two columns of Sir J.
Keane's army lost, in the space of a single
year, ~ 3 , o o ocattle of all descriptions, 10,983
of these being hired camels.
In the second Afghan War, on the three
lines of advance, forces numbering less than
'Numb.frs of camp-followers were subsisting on fried
skins of sheep, the coagulated blood of animals, and such
8
roots as they could pick up In the neighbourhood of the
encampments.'-Jfe~~zon'nIs of Afgham'stnn, by T. H.
Stoequeler. The above facts are corroborated by Major
Hough.
"fie
March of the I~zdr(sArrny, by Major Hough.

,

36,000 men lost, as we have already seen,
50,ooo camels in eleven months ; and it took
Sir D. Stewart's division of 7300 men 54
days t o move from Sulckur to Kandahar,
though there was no loitering by the way
and only one skirmish with the tribes.
These facts, and others lilce them, must
lead the Russian military experts t o results
differing materially from those which I have
submitted to my readers. They would perceive that if we could not send an army
through the Bolan and across the desert of
BeIuchistan in bodies of 3000 fighting men,
with all that that term implies, neither could
they ; and would probably have to own that
the commander would be luclcy who could
squeeze his t r o w s through the one, and find
water for them in the other, in det%chrnents
of half that size; and this single change in
the factors o$ my calculation adds 50 days
to the roo which I assigned to the journey.
Further, they would perceive, what indeed
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I have already pointed out, that even a
small a r m y has, of necessity, its halts and
its delays, and they, cnuld not hide from
themselves the self-evident truth that a
large force must be far more exposed to retarding influences than a little one ; and so my
second assumption that the Russians could
move on in one unbroken stGarn, steadily
advancing day by day., falls to the ground,
ancl the 1 5 0 days to which the time occupied by tke march has grown must be still
further extended. But every additional clay
means additional supplies for' a quarter of a
million of men and a mil~idnanimals of one
kindor another ; and every increaseof supplies
means a n increase in the means of transport;'
and every increase in the means of transport

*

.

It means also a large i n ~ r e a s ein the number of campfollowers, since one muleteer must be allowed for every
three mules, and one camel-mar,. to th% same number of
camels used for the collveyallce of regimental baggage, or
to every four camels used for carrying commissariat
stores.-H. B. H.

P

p u t s a fresh drag on the slow movements
of the endless living train, winding painfully between mouttaip walls, or clinging to
the narrow traclc leading from well to well.
A n d they would have still to provide for
t h e carriage of all those essential articles of
food-meat, dead or alive, spirits, tea, sugar,
hospital com!'orts, etc., which I have omitted
from the dietary both of officers and menfor I have put all, from the highest to the
lowest, on the same low scale,-and,
this
done, the insoluble problem of how to feed
the camels that carry grain for the transport
and baggage animals would 'remain to be
f a c e d ; and yet another, a t which I have
hitherto only glanced, namely, how to time
the invasion so*as to avoid floods in the
Bolan, deadly heat in the *desert, a ~ , dyet to
reach India-not the wilderness which forms
its outer zone, but the rich, populous India
of their dreams-before the return of the
h o t weather shall close Beluchistan behind
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them, leaving them, from the very outset of
the campaign, cut off from all communicatioll
with their base. T-he, margin is of the
narrowest; for to reach Multan at the
beginning of February, if the march is to
take 180 days-and it cannot take less-the
leading- detachments must start early in
August, which would bring tl?em into the
Bolan when innumerable torrents, born of
the summer rains, are rushing down the
mountain-sides, tearing great gaps in every
road of man's construction, and filling the
wide, stony channel of the river, which is
the real passage througl~the defile-and into
the desert, when it is in its most pestilential
state; yet to delay till September means
beginning their campaign in March, sup*
posing 01%generals were to permit them to
approach R'lultan, within a month of the
date when the desert again .becomes impassable for rnan and beast.
Can I now b e accused of presumption if
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I declare my conviction that the Russian
Government, whose military advisers should
lay before it all these fwts and considerations,
would abandon, once and for all, the dream
of invading India, and turn its thoughts
either towards indirect ways of injuring us
a n d shaking our power in the East, or
towards thenmore honourable measures by
which- peace and good-will being established
between two great Empires, separated from
each other by the strong hand of Nature
herself-both might profit by the good work
already accomplished, or still to be accomplished; by each.

CHAPTER V
T H E I-IINDU ICUSI-I PASSES
From Faizabad to Peshawar, vir2 the Dureand the Lahuri
l'asses, 373 miles ; and fro111 Faizabad to Rashmir, vid
t l ~ cI)um and the Borzil Passes, 029 miles.

FRORI
what distant regions the 30,000 men
would originally be drawn, whom, in his
plan of a general Russian advance upon
India, Sir C. MacGregor assigned for the
advailce upon Peshawar by Chitral, and
upon Kashmir, by Gilgllit, is a question outside the scope of this inquiry ; but there can
be no dqubt that* the secckdary base of
forces illvading India, by either route, would
be at Faizabad, in Badakshan, a dilapidated
town1 on the Kokcha River, at the foot of
I Faizabacl was . destroyed by Morad Bey, Chief of
Kunduz, in 1821, and when visited, many years later, by

01
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the I-Iindu Kush, and that, in the second
instance, they would come from Tashkend
and Marghilan.
T h e Tashkend column, marching by way
of Jam, would cross the Oxus by the Kilif
ferry and proceed thence, by Balkh, Khulm
(Tashkurghan), and ICunduz, to Faizabad, a
journey of S18 miles, of the dificulties and
hardships of which we can gain some ide"z1
by turning back to the Russian papers of
1878, ancl reacling'the accouilts of the sufferings which, in its first stage alone, a Russian
division has already endured. From .them
we learn what ravages the awful heat, the
suffocating dust-s torms, ancl the scarcity of
water made among both troops and trans-

-
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Lieutenant J. I?. Wood, he found not a vEstigc of the
ancient capital of B a d a l s s l ~ ~ nsave
,
the witl~ered trees
wliich once adorned its gardens, and the dilapidated walls
of n fort rvhicll wts still standing on a rock comrnax~ding
the entrance to the upper valley, herc only 400 yards
wide ; since then, however, it has bee11 partially restored.
-1-1. B. H.
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port animals, the latter dwindling away till
tl~cycould scarcely meet the requirements
of the military train and ambulance; l. and
there certainly cannot be less to bear between
Jam and the Oxus, or on that strip of road,
57 miles long, between Icilif and Balkh,
where the whole country is so cut up by
irrigation channels that two of the marches
ate only three miles long, one five miles,
and others l~arcllylonger.
T h e Marghilan column, marching by way
of Ush and the Alai Valley, would effect the
passage of the Oxus at Samti Bala. This
route, tl~oughvery circuitous, is somewhat

.

The miseries of these unhappy troops seem to have
culminated on their arrival at Sarakul and Jam. 'Here
began,' so wrote n corresnondent of the Sovn~zendlavestf,
'privations &ich may well be termed diabolical. Imagine
to yourself a perfectly level sieppe, a heat of 499 degrees
RCaumur, and a hot wind, and it was in this climate we
had to remain more than a month. . Dysentery, typhus
fever, and sunstroke were the inevitable results of a sojourn
in such a climate. Soldiers' funerals were to be witnessed
every day.'

. .
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shorter than that previously described ; still,
5 7 1 miles is a considerable distance, regarded as the preliminary stage of a military
movement, and the rugged mountain ranges,
over which it is carried, must double the time
that would be required to accomplish it in
a n ordinarily open and level country.
A third 3oute branching off from the
Marghilan-Faizabad road, at the head of
t h e Alai Valley, turns south over the Parnir
I<hargosh, crosses the Murghab River, traverses the Alichur ancl Little Pamir, runs
down the Baroghil Pass, and lands the
traveller in a district devoid of cultivation,
grass, and fuel, with the choice of two paths
open t o him, the one leading to Chitral, the
other to Gilghit ; but this road I must
decline even to consider a handfa1 of men
might make their way along it, but handfuls of men are not armies, and it is with
armies that our problem is concerned.
To return to Faizabad. Considering the
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immense interval which separates that place
from Tashkend and Marghilan, and the
nature of the couiltry t h r ~ u g hwhich it must
be approached, I think it is safe to concIude
that an army of any iillportance will take a
whole summer to concentrate there. In
addition, therefore, to the supplies necessary
0
for the second stage of their expedition,
d l ~ i c hwill be begun the following year, as
soon as the snow has disappeared from the
passes of the Hindu Kush, the Russian
troops must carry with them, or find
collected at Faizabad, a sufficiency of provisions to support themselves and their
transport during the intervening winter and
spring ; and all supplies, whether intended
for immediate or future use, must have been
brought from afar, as they will not be
procurable either in the city, or in the district
in which it is situated; and I need not say
that, t o keep open the army's communications with R~lssiavi2 Tashkend-those viii
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Margllilan would be lost in winter-the
whole of Afghan Turlristan, which would
have been conquered- before either column
began its advance, must be held in force, its
chief cities being not only occupied, but
connected together by a chain of fortified
posts.
6,
I will suppose that all these conditions
have beell fulfilled, and that the two Russiai
columns, their march safely accomplished,
have spent the winter a t Faizabad in peace
and in tolerable comfort,-what is the task
which would confront them when they again
set themselves in motion ?
They have, as we have seen, two objectives, Peshawar and Kashrnir : can these be
attained in the eourse of + single summer?
There are 41 marches from ~ Z z a b a dto
Gilghit, 19 to Chitrai, and fourteen to the '
northern end 6f theDura Pass,wllicll is 14,Soo
feet high, only open for a little over three
months in the year-let us say for a hundred

,
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days-and so difficult, that, if I take 300 fighting men as the largest number that can cross
it in a day, I shall probf~blybe exaggerating.'
By timing the start from Faizabad so as to
bring the leading detachment to the foot of
the pass the very day it becomes practicable,
it will be just possible to get the whole
C
30,000 menbclear of it before it is again
closed by snow, arid the first fifty detachments might concentrate at Gilghit on the
g ~ s day,
t
and the second fifty at Chitral on
the 119th day. But between Gilghit and
Kashmir are two formidable passes, the
Borzil, 13,500 feet high, and the Hatu Pir,
lower, but excessively difficult ; and between
Chitral and Peshawar there is the Lahuri
Pass, 10,450 feet ip height ;a so that farther
advance 'by either route is impossible, and
both columns inust speind a second winter by
8

There are three other passes bctwccn Badaltshan and
the Agram, Kharteza, and Nuksan, but these
are covered wit11 perpetual snow.-Mahamecl Ameen.
1

Chitral, viz.
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the way. Much more than a winter, indeed,
since the advance could not be resumed
before the May of .the following year; and
during the whole twelve months that these
30,000 fighting men would be waiting or
marching, they, and all the living creatures
belonging to them, must be fed out of stores
carried with them, or previously accumulated
at Gilghit and Chitral, stores derived from
that distant base, the locality of which we
have not felt called upon to determine.
Nay, more, provision must also have been
made for the third stage of the movement,
since there could be no lingering, after the
southern passes were once more open, for
fresh supplies to arrive; the advance must
be immediate, the time in which it can b e
made being once again confined wfthin very
narrow limits.'
1 Last year 55300 maunds, equivalent to 27,500 mule
loads of food-stuffs of all kinds, not including forage, were
required for the provisioning of the 3 m troops within the
limits of the Gilghit agency. It is possible that each mule

.

T H E HINDU KUSH PASSES

'a,
~"4

1
1

99

Many portions of the road from Faizabad
to Chitral are swept, even in summer, by
sudden and terrible storms, and the Kafir
tribes bordering upon it are so fierce that
the merchants who venture into these terrible
regions absolutely prefer the Nuksan Pass to
the Dura, though, in crossing it from the
Badakshan side, they 'have to slide down
upon the frozen snow on a leathern shirt, and
ponies, if taken by this pass, are tied hands
and feet, after having been relieved of their
burden, and then rolled down upon the snow,'
by which 'processes both men and beasts
generally reach the base of the pass safely.'l
Still, this march, as a whole, may be considered easy compared to that from Chitral to
made two kurneys, but% the Russians' case, for every 3000
men 27,500 mules must be provided, since no second trip
could b e made within the tilfie during which the Dura Pass
remains open, and for the provisioning of 30,000, ten times
Where are
that number of mules would be nec:ssary.
275,000 mules to be obtained? and if procurable, how a r e
they to be fed?-H. B. H.
Aiahamed Aneen.
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Gilghit. Two mountain tracks collllect those
two towns: the one vi2 the Jhui Pass-14,8 I 2
feet high and very difficult-is quite impracticable; the other by Mastuj, the Shundur
Pass, and Gakuch, although more direct and
somewhat easier, bristles with difficulties,
and to bring laden*animals safely over it, the
troops must be preceded by sappers and
miners, who will have hard work to smooth
away the worst of the obstacles.
And when the Russian columns, or what
remains of them, and their transport quit
their tertiary base, and enter upon the last
stage of their mighty adventure, it will be
to encounter equal difficulties and fatigues
and greater dangers. The Lahuri Pass,
between Chitral and Peshayar, is intersected
again and again by the bed of thi! torrent
which drains it, and ih summer is strewn
with the trunks and branches of deodar
and pine uprooted by the previous winter's
storms ; whilst the low - lying, swampy
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valleys1 between the pass and British territory, always unhealthy, are during the hot
weather unbearably elose and sultry, more
oppressive than the plains of ~ddia.
T h e leading Russian detachments would
probably meet with strong resistance on the
Lahuri and a t Dir, a large mud fort covering the populous village of Arian Koh ; and
beyond Dir, in Swat, they would come into
collisioll with the warlike Yusafzai Tribes,
one of which, the Bunerwals, can put 8000
fighting men into the field.2 They it vas who,
Large quantities of rice are grown in these valleys.-H. B. H.
a Lieutenant A. H. Mason, R.E., Record of Exfleditions
agai?zst the Nortk- West Frontier Tn3e.r. Colonel Warburton, however, estimates the Bunerwals fighting strength
a t 15,000. 'There is,'*he says, ' noafiner race in the northwest frontier of India than the Bunerwals. Simple and
austere in their habits, religious and truthful in their ways,
hospitable to all who seek shelter amongst them, free from
secret assassinations, they are brigh? examples of what
good materials a Pathan tribe can develop into, clinging
with the fondest affection to their country, and ancient
customs handed down to them by their forefathers.'

at the Ambela Pass in the year r 863, held

6032 British ancl Native troops, under Sir
Neville Chambel-lain, in check for nearly
two months,' inflicting upon them a loss in
liillecl and wounded of 67 officers and 841
men. The expedition was not even directed
against the Bunerwals, but against the refi-actory Hindustani fanatics who had settlecl a t
Mallta; yet these independent and highspirited mountaineers refused it a passage
through their land. Are they more likely to
grant one to Russian troops, who, hundreds
of miles from their base, and broken up into
weak detachments, would be far less capabIc
of enforcing their demand ?
And how are the invaders to cross the
Swat, a deep and rapid riyer, 450 feet wide,
from which every native skiff would have
been removed, and do&inated by the British
fort of Abaza?? Are we to suppose that
an expedition which had needed three successive summers for its accornplisl~rnent,
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would have been so s~~ccessfully
concealed
from the Indian Government that no British
force would be waiting to overwhelm the
Russiails as they set foot on Brltish soil ?
And beyond the Swat River and Fort
Abazai is a branch of the Kabul River,
fordable, indeed, except after heavy rain, but
defended by Fort ~habkadgr; and eight
miIes further still there is the Nargumail
branch of the same stream ; and ten miles
beyond that the large cantonment of Peshawar, connected by rail with every part of
India. S o that, by this route as by the
Bolan, the onIy question for us wouId be
where to crush our foes, and, for them,
whether death or surrender slzould be their
choice; and if they were 50,000 strong
instead* of rg,ooo, with the facilities for
concentrating troops at Peshawar which
we possess, the result must still be the
same.
The road from Gilghit to Kashmir is

'

much better known than that from Chitral
to Peshawar, but, in this case, familiarity has
not bred contempt.. :No one who has not
visited these' inhospitable regions,' so wrote
in 1893 a traveller who has a wide personal
experience of them, 'can fully realise the
difficulties which beset the organisation of
even the smanest military expedition. T h e
road from' Kashmir to Gilghit, roughly, is
240 miles in length, and traverses, for the
most part, a practically desert country. All
supplies have to be carried up from Kashmir,
while even the grass to feed transport
animals has to be brought from a distance.
In the summer the heat in the arid gorges
is intense, and in some of the waterless
marches the b o ~ e sof dead mules are a
frequent sight. The road becomes "Impassable in early winter (October), for two passes
have to be cr~ssed,both liable to sudden
b

1

Mr. E. F. Knight, the author of Where Three Ew#~es

Meet.

crales of deadly coldness, which surprise
and kill numbers of travellers every year.
Last autumn one of. Lhese gales, accompallied by a snowstorm, destrofed a whole
train of 300 mules, together with their
drivers. '
A similar disaster which happened in the
Borzil Pass, in the middle of dctober I 89 I ,
will be still fresh in the memory of many of
my readers, when a detachment of Goorkl~as,
uncler Captain Barnett, was caught in a
blizzard. About 100 men and followers,
Barnett amongst the number, were frostbitten, many of whom died afterwards at
Astor, while the hands and feet of others
dropped off. Their gallant leader, after a
protracted illness, recovered, not however
without ?he loss of several toes.
T h e prospect of sdch dangers and hardships will quicken the movements of the
Gilghit column, and it would be pleasant for
them, on arriving on the north-east margin
b
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of Lake Wular, to take to the water and
float quietly down to Srinagar; but I fear
they would hardly find boats waiting to
convey theh. Whether they approach that
city, however, by land or by water, they
will certainly enter it only as prisoners of
war, f i r to have assembled there a force of
double theirqstrength, would have been no
*
excessive strain on the resources of the
Indian Government, especially if, by the date
of our hypothetical Russian invasion, that
government had ceased to value railways in
proportion to their uselessness and unremunerativeness, and had constructed that
line from Rawal Pindi to Kashmir, the plans
and estimates for which have long been in
its possession.
There are really two routes fro: Chitral
t o - ~ e s h a w a r ,but as 'the second joins the
Khyber at Jdalabad, and the mouth of the
Khyber will have been sealed by that
fortified camp, in the teeth of which Sir E.
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I-Iamley failed to see how a single Russian
regiment could ever issue from that deep
and narrow gorge, it would be waste of time
to describe it here ; but it will not be useless
to recall the terms in which the abovenamed strategist spoke of the expectation
that, through it, danger might some day
threaten India.
Why, he asked, in a lecture to which I
have more than once referred-why shoulcl
Russia push her forces to the sources of the
Oxus, cross the Hindu Kush, and march
2 50 miles down the Kunar Valley to reach
Kabul or the Ichyber, when she could attain
either objective by shorter and better roads?
If she held the less difficult, she would have
no need to use the-more difficult roads ; and
if she d:d not hold the former, she could
not risk an advance'by the latter. Why,
then, should she be supposed capable of
entering ' on such an enterprise by such a
line ' ?
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Why, indeed ? And why should she be
expected to commit the same folly by any
other circuitous and~hspelesslydifficult route?
The answgr is simple : Because we English
are fools : not the Russian Government-that
is wise enough in its generation, and has no
more idea of invading India by the Hindu
Kush than Gf organising an expedition for
the conquest of Canada viii; Siberia, though
to further her general policy of inducing us
to weaken our military position in India, by
scattering our troops over an enormous and almost inaccessible area, and our political position, by forcing us to tax our Indian subjects
to the last limit of their patience and their
purse, she sends from time to time a score
or two of Cossacks to 40 a little hunting
and exploring in those uncoLfortable
regions.
t
It is enough to make any reasonable
Englishman blush with shame, to think that
the well-being of our Indian Empire is being
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sacrificecl to absurd and ignorant fears-fears
that are making oi England the cat's-paw of
the government wllose aims she is supposed
to be circumventing, and the laughing-stock
of every foreign military man who happens
to turn his attention to such remote and
negligeable places as Chitral, or Gilghit, or
the Pamirs,
I 1;now well the arguments by which this
\veal; and foolish policy is defended : that
we must keep the coming struggle well away
from our ow11 borders; that we must carry
war into the enemy's country ; that we must
reduce to submission all the petty tribes of
which w e have ever heard the name, lest, in
our hour of danger, they should pour down
from their hills and divide *and brealr our
strength,' But I claim to have shown
that, so far as Russia it concerned, the pften
~redictedstruggle could not touch the outermost fringe of our Indian Empire, and that
we can nd more carry war into her dominions
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than she into ours; and as regards disturbances that may arise within our own
borders, I believe ?I can dissipate that
anxiety allo, or a t least prove that it derives
most of its probability and all its real force
from the very measures that we are asked
t o think: necessary to its relief. But this
' 6'
subject, no less important than that to which
t h e present paper has been devoted, must
wait till, in Tract No. 2, I have examined
t h e frontier with which India is at this
moment blessed, a n d that wider frontier, t o
which the most anxious of her many anxious
friends, from Lord Lytton and Sir George
Colley down to Lord Roberts and Mr.
George Curzon, have invited her to look
forward as the best security that their
CI
military and political foresight can promise
her ; and have submitted t o my readers many
curious and instructive facts with regard t o
t h e defensive works-fortifications, strategic
roads and strategic railways-which
are
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absorbing so large a proportion of India's
revenues, and also with regard to what, I
suppose, I must call .the defensive wars,
which, equally with the works,' owe their
existence to that ' scientific ' conception.

Printed by T,and A. CONSTADLE,
Printers to Iler IvIajsty
at the Edinburgh University Press '
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Note.
In this map all military railways not
actually required for the defence of the
frontier of 1876 have been omitted.
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